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INTRODUCTION TO OPERATING PHILOSOPHY
}
This introduction is written for the reader who may be unfamil-
iar with the Panel's role and to inform traditional users of the
Panel's veport of changes in our operation.
lite Panel is created and chartered by Congress as a senior ad-
visory group to NASA management, most specifically the NASA Admini-
strator. the members are appointed by public law for six-year-terms.
The criteria for their selection include execu ltive experience and
knowledge of the requirements of running large organizations where
development programs have inherent risks and appropriate policies
have to be evolved. Members must also be sensitive to the account-
ability requirements facing senior public officials.
The Panel conducts its work as spelled out in the NASA policy
on the Panel:
"Pursuant to carrying out its statuatory duties
the Panel will review, evaluate and advise on those
program mttaagement policies, management systems,
procedures and practices that contribute to risk
identification and assessment by management. Pri-
ority shall be given to those programs that in-
volve the safety of manned flight." (NMI 1156.140)
Through its inspections, the Panel requires project management at both
NASA and contractor levels to review and explicitly explain their tech-
nical management system and decision making processes, the basis for
confidence in crew safety and the rationale for risks that have to be
1
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accepted. On Apollo, Skylab and ASTP the Panel principally operated
through on-site inspections by the full Panel. The Panel, however,
augmented its approach of full Panel inspections with detailed fact-
finding by specific teams and designated individuals. This was done
in order to gain greater visibility into significant areas on Shuttle.
The Panel's approach reinforces and supports decision making that
minimizes crew risk and serves to assure problems are worked in a timely
manner and at the lowest appropriate management level. The Panel's re-
port to the Administrator and Congress seeks to provide them indepen-
dent assessment and substantial information to aid them in their over-
sight responsibility and keeps before senior flight management' p .atten-
tion those issues critical to crew safety. The Panel thus contributes
to (1) policy formulation, (2) program planning ana °ccomplishment of
program objectives more effectively, (3) agency management decision
making, and (4) achievement of economies in the program. Examples are
cited in the report to the Office of Managemant and Budget, Appendix A.
More detail is provided in the Space Shuttle Program's response to the
1976 Annual Report, Appendix B.
The Panel is very much aware of its continuing responsibility to
Congress'and is pleased that the House Committee on Science and Tech-
nology found the Panel's 1976 Annual Report useful for their own re-
view. The Committris "Space Shuttle 1977 Status Report" states that
the Panel's independent review and 1976 report "noted a number of
critical areas and recommended actions to be taken to strengthen the
program. In making this (the Committee's) current review, the Panel's
2
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comments were noted to aid in assessing the posture of the Space Shuttle
Program." As the report notes, the first topic discussed in the issues
section of this report is one that had been examined by the Panel.
One of the Panel's objectives is to provide timely reports that
add to both the public's informed understanding and the development of
appropriate criteria of public accountability. Thus the Panel submits
a comprehensive report.
With its responsibilities to NASA, the Congress and the public in
mind, the Panel submits this report. The report reflects the Panel's
concentration on areas critical to a successful Approach and Landing
Test Program (ALT) in 1977 as well as the critical elements for the
Orbital Flight Test Program (OFT).
The primary goal of the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) program
is to gather sufficient flight test data to verify safe Orbiter sub-
sonic aerodynamic flight and landing with an Orbiter and ground oper-
ations configured as closely as practical to the hardware and soft-
ware to be used in the approach and landing phase of orbital missions.
The Panel focused on those ALT activities which provide certification
of the required program elements.
Thuh the Panel reviewed the following areas of major significance
for ALT: mission planning and crew training, flight-readiness of the
Carrier Aircraft and the Orbiter including its flight control and avi-
onics systems, facilities, communications and ground support equipment,
and the management system for risk assessment. Our observations and
rl:commendations are consolidated into the first two chapters of this
a
report. The chapter on mission operations includes an assessment of
mission management, mission planning, communications and Around oper-
ations. The chapter on vehicles for ALT includes an assessment of the
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (modified 747) and the Orbiter including the
critical avionics and flight control system.
While the Orbital Flight Test Grogram (OFT) is scheduled to begin
in 1979 the major elements are now in an advanced state of design eval-
uation, manufacturing and assembly. Our observations and recommends-
tions are consolidated into chapters on the Orbiter and the principal
elements of the Shuttle propulsion system, i.e., the Main Engine, the
External Tank and the Solid [rocket Booster.
The first volume contains the Panel's observations and recommen-
dations and the second volume gives the supporting detail and summa-
rizes the results of the Panel's inspection activities.
As for the work plan for the current year the Panel plans to pro-
vide flight-readiness assessment reports on each phase of the ALT test
program where there is a significant new risk. Thus the Panel plans
to submit short reports on (1) the first mated flight with the captive
Orbiter manned and its systems active, (2) the first separation, approach,
and landing of the Orbiter, and (3) the first captive flight of the Orbiter
in the orbital configuration without a tailcone. This will also be a
major year for activities on the principal elements required for OFT
since these are only two years from .First flight. Furthermore, this is
the time for the significant Critical Design Reviews as well as prep-
arations for major ground tests to prove the designs.
It
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4ALT MISSION OPERATIONS
A. OBSERVATIONS
It is important to begin by noting that one of the goals of ALT
is to configure mission and ground operations as closely to the approach
used in the approach and landing phase of the orbital mission since that
goal explains the management concept that put the flight of the vehicle
under JSC direction and ground operations under KSC although the flights
were physically to take place at DFRC. The Panel's initial thought was
that it would have made management and communication simpler if the to-
tal operation would have been under DFRC control but we recognize the
tradeoff and focused on how the management concept would be made to
work.
This concept meant that a suitable organizational approach had to
be implemented to direct and coordinate.these efforts and we found that
the Shuttle program had created a dedicated project organization with
a sound management system.
JSC "controls" the activities at DFRC including the checkout and
the actual flights. The checkout is accomplished through the ACE sta-
tion which is at Rockwell's manufacturing facility at Palmdale. Thus
during checkout there will be data links from the Orbiter and support
equipment at DFRC to Palmdale, 'Downey and JSC. As for flight control
the combined active 747/Orbiter and active orbiter flying alone will be
under direct JSC's Mission Control Center at all times. This has the
advantage of exercising the communication and computer facilities at
5
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JSC much as they will function during OFT and later operational flights.
The 747 when separated from the Orbiter will be under DFRC control. The
flights of the 747 mated with the inert Orbiter, which were flown in
February and March 1977, were under DFRC control at all times.
Our review of the reliability of Lhe complex communications sys-
tem to support a mission with a manned active Orbiter found that the
program's policy is that any loss of communications between the car-
rier/Orbiter and JSC prior to separation will result in a decision not
to separate the Orbiter. Loss of communications after separation is
apparently an acceptable risk and it is assumed the Orbiter car. con-
1 4nue landing with no further assistance from JSC. Although there are
redundant systems that make such a loss improbable, the Panel questioned
the economy of eliminating DFRC as support center for an Orbiter approach
and landing.
The program's position is that tests of the communication system
should provide adequate confidence in its reliability. There are no
known reasons to doubt that the crew can land :he Orbiter without
assistance from JSC in the unlikely event of loss of communications
between JSC and the Orbiter after separation. The Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel is satisfied that those responsible for the planning
and testing of this system are highly qualified and well aware of po-
tential problems. The program has been keeping ahead of scheduled re-
quirements and have planned extensive tests to assure the performance
c
of the system. The comments in the recommendations are suggestions
to enhance the margin of safety that is acknowledged to be there.
t
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The Panel $ in considering the approach to mission planning, found
that the ALT program's objective is to progress in minimum steps con-
sistent with flight safety from test conditions that provide the great-
est margins of safety to test conditions anticipated in the first OFT
approach and landing. This is a reasonable and prudent approach to
taking the necessary risks to meet the program objectives. We found
the management system made effective use of special working groups -
such as the Flight Techniques Panel to coordinate the efforts of those
involved in designing mission objectives and flight techniques to meet
program objectives and to surface and resolve issues originating in
differing viewpoints.
Alao, the Panel has been in a continuous discussion with the pro-
gram on the planning of crew training. For instance, the Panel is
pleased to learn that NASA utilizes the simulator at Ames. Here again
our recommendations are to enhance a program that is reasonable.
Finally, the Panel has reviewed the facilities and GSE associated
with mission operations. Of special note is the method of lifting the
Shuttle Orbiter and the facilities for attaching it to the 747. The
plans for checkout appear to be adequate but will require continual
surveillance since the system contains several single-point failure
possibilities which could cause major damage.
Any program like ALT with so much experimental dimension in it
will require changes along the way and this will too. Therefore, the
Panel plans to review mission operations for each phase of the ALT
program before it begins in light of the experience from prior missions
c
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and the new requirements for that phase. Our objectives will be to
assess within the limits of our resources the degto, ,+ to whinh:
1. The program management system has defined a set of
mission rules and a flight plan that provides a reasonahle basis of
confidence that the nominal flight plans can be successfully executed.
2. The flight planning process has used A conservative
approach in planning the nominal mission and providing for contingency
and abort situations including emergency separation and jettison.
D. KECK, N^DAT1:y5
1. In the lifting body flights, the pilots were substantially
assisted by , calls from the control room where a pilot was available
showing the actual location i°. , the vehicle ae. compared with the planned
locations. The Panel is very impressed by both the , Lmplicity and
effectiveness of this "modified GCA" in assisting the busy pilot on
these short flights. For ALT it is understood that such a plot is
planned at Mission Control JSC. It appears prudent to maintain the
same plot at DFRC as a backup in the event of the highly unlikely but
still possible loss of voice communications between Houston and Edwards.
The Panel wonders what penalty the ALT would encounter by including this
already ' available backup system.
2. The closest actual experiences to the ALT flights are those
that were gained during the lifting body and earlier rocket aircraft
flights. We should not overlook any opportunity to use this background
wherever appropriate. For example, it is suggested that lifting body
pilots be requested to fly the STA and Orbiter simulators and provide
S
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comments on their flight experiences. Similarlyq it may be useful to
have a general critt..yue of ALT mission plans by a group of experienced
personnel who have not been involved to date. Phis group might include
such people as Chuck Yeager, Bob White, Bob Rushworth and lifting body
engineers of AFFTC.
3. The Panel suggests that crew training might be enhanced by
the use of additional existing simulators with capabilities different
from simulators now being used. For example, the Air Force simulator
(AFVrC Engineering Simulators) at Edwards AFB has proved very valuable
for lifting body training. The Air Force simulator is not as compre-
hensive as other such training devices, but changes in aerodynamic
values are easy to accomplish and should be useful in pilot training.
Also, interaction between Air Force and NASA personnel would be enhanced.
4. Experience in lifting body simulator training and missions
show that pilots are able to accomplish tasks at a higher rate in the
simulator than in actual flights. Use of "fast time" simulators for
training is one way of insuring that the pilot is not overburdened in
	
flight. It is reconinended that the use of such a simulator be given 	 4
further consideration.
ti
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THE VZHICLRS FOR ALT
A.I.ONS
The ALT program calls for the following phases (1) mated flight
of the Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (modified 747) with an inert unmanned
Orbiter, (2) mated flight with the captive Orbiter manned and systems
active, (3) separation and landing of the manned active Orbiter with
its tailcone on, and (4) approach and landing of the Orbiter in its
orbital configuration without the tailcone.
The Panel has been monitoring the testing on the Shuttle Carrier
Aircraft (747) 0 Orbiter 101 and the mated configuration through its
own inspections and fact-finding as well as attendance at internal
program reviews such as the Critical Design Review and the Customer
Acceptance and Readiness Reviews conducted for Zhe actual flight hard-
ware. It appears that the program to modify the 747 into the carrier
aircraft has gone well and the Panel sees no critical areas For top
management attention.
The Panel has reviewed the readiness of the Shuttle Carrier Air-
craft and inert Orbiter for the first phase of the flight test program.
It appears to us that the primary elements of the total system are in
a development and test status so that this flight may be conducted in
a safe manner.
Specifically, the 747 modifications appear to be complete and the
risks due to this part of the system well understood and controlled by
the planned flight program. The Orbiter and its attachment to the 747
appear to be Ptructurally adequate under the conditions planned for the
10	 ti
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test. The flight plan which includes simulation of the eventual drop
altitude and velocity is calculated to not load either the Shuttle
Orbiter or 747 airframe beyond prudent limits (0.75 of the design
load).
After this flight phase, the Orbiter will go through a modifi-
cation and test period to prepare it for operation as a manned active
system. As can be expected there is substantial work to be completed
before the vehicle is ready for certification, The readiness of the
total system is dependent on the completion and validation of all crit-
ical elements including the avionics and the flight control system.
During the early part of the year the major concern about the avi-
onics system was the definition of the specifications for the software
and the completion of the actual software programs. The Panel finds
that the emphasis put on this problem has resulted in software deliv-
eries and testing that seem to be adequate for the ALT tests. In these
tests the dev einds on the avionics system will be relatively simple and
of short duration. The system, in increasing complexity, is being ex-
tensively simulated at JSC, Downey and in the 101 vehicle. We think
that the software is acceptable unless last-minute changes are made
that cannot be adequately verified because of time. It should be
pointed out that the software is not being independently verified, but
is being validated by repetil:ive exercising in the course of component
and system testing. This is not necessarily bad, but we are doubling
up the validation and verification which must be carefully monitored.
The program for the backup flight control system is in good shape
11
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wtth a lot of experience, because it was delivered relatively early
and has been used extensively in the early testing programs.
During the latter part of the year testing was begun in earnest
using the new programs running in the 101 vehicle as well as the simu-
lation laboratories. As might be expected, problems began to surface 	 '
with the actual flight hardware.
The computers themselves seem to have their share of hardware
problems, but they do not seem to be of a generic Nature and should
not be critical. However, the recent power supply problem should be
evaluated.
The balance of the hardware shows some problems in individual
units, but should not affect a satisfactory ALT test, The fact that
the testing is rather late in the game is more responsible than the
inherent quality of the hardware operating under the short time, rela-
tively simple ALT missions.
Currently the problems being experienced are largely those re-
lated to the total systems operation in real life. The vehicle it-
self (101) has physical characteristics of its own that affect feed-
back and system response that must be ironed out by either soft or
hardware changes. The problem is one of tight scheduling, and the
time needed to do the testing necessary to get the system to an ac-
ceptable performance level for ALT. The first round of system prob-
lems is under correction and will be checked in the simulators and
labs and then put back in 101 for verification and, hopefully, only
fine tuning will be necessary. At this time, from an avionics point
12
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of view, we would expect the program to achieve the ALT schedule, par-
m
ticularly since the first unmanned captive flights do not require ac-
x
	 tive avionics, although they may well impinge on testing time necessary
for later ALT flights.
Thus, the panel's assessment of the avionics system is that it
f will be ready and acceptable for the limited demands of the ALT pro-
gram. The step-by-step nac .ure of ALT enhances the confidence in the
avionics adequacy. Ilia testing in the various simulators as wall as
in 101 is rapidly building up the ne3cessaar^,• verification time of the
avionics system.
The hydraulic and flight control system has, of course, been the
subject of intense reviews since the recent failures during design test-
ing and the basic design concept is to make it a fortress rather than
failure tolerant.
Recent test failures indicate that seal leakage could drain the
hydraulic system ntakiug it useless. The modifications for ALT include
strengthened primary seals, the addition of backup seals and the addi-
tiun of a reservoir system so that any leakage wou,d be slow enough for
the system to be refilled by Lite reservoir until there was a safe land-
ing. Wq agree with the need for these nods and agree that such mods
satisfactorily reeimee Lite risks in that part of the system so its can
be used safely on ALT. The Panel concurs with the Williams' study
that concept changes in elements of the control system should be con-
sidered for orbital operations.
NASA's senior management is to be corimended for the comprehensive
13
review of the system they authorized and the review done by NASA's
Chief Engineer, Walt Williams, and his team of non-NASA experts. The
Panel agrees with the priorities of concern suggested by the Williams'
group. The recommendations that follow re,li ct our co:tcerns.
The Panel has given particular attention to the APU which pro-
vides the power for the hydraulic system since it will be used longer
on the active Orbiter flights than on orbital flights and a failure
could deactivate all controls. Further, in order to assure sufficient
fuel for the ALT missions the APU's will be started, stopped and re-
started during the mission. The program's pooition is that the APU
fuel capacity usage is directly dependent on the time histories of
actuator valve responses commanded by the avionics. Detailed simu-
lations and validation on ADL/FCHL and SAIL of the total hydraulic
flow requirements over a mission are being conducted. Test data is
being evaluated. The results of these studies and simulated flight
demonstrations will identify any deficiencies in capacity.
Our recommendations on this system and other elements of the flight
control system are noted below.
B. RECONMENDATIONS
1.- The Panel acknowledges the massive and dedicated effort
applied to the avionics system during last year and can only recom-
mend the continued use of the simulators and Orbiter 101 to build up
the testing experietic , s the extent of which is the only real verifier
of a hardware-software system.
2.	 If the modified actuator system is not installed in time
.:.
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for the regularly scheduled integrated tests, a special thorough and
to end integrated test of the hydraulic system should be required for
certification of flightworthiness for ALT.
3. Parasitic uses of the main hydraulic power systems are not
considered to be acceptable in most modern aircraft practice without
careful attention to isolation systems, and should be minimized or
eliminated if possible by provision of special power systems before the
first free flight of the Orbiter (ALT). It would appear that there are
reasonably simple solutions for all such individual systems (brakes,
nose wheel steering, etc.). it is possible that on ALT the reservoir
can handle the largest expected leak.
4. The APU's are can a very tight schedule but their "thorough
certification must not be short circuited. Further,, the Panel suggests
serious consideration of a backup source of hydraulic power and added
fuel capacity so that starting and stopping of the APUs in active ALT
flights are not necessary.
5. Orbiter software presently limits control surface movement
rate to 200
 per second. The Panel recommends that changes in software
be considered to permit an increased rate of movement. Experience in the
X-15, X-84, YF 16 and h-1 graphically illustrated that flight control
problems can result from restrictive rate Limits. It is understood that
hydraulic system capacity may become a limiting factor for control sur-
face. If simulation with higher rate control surface movement suggests
any kind of capacity restraints on the control of the Orbiter an increase
of capacity should be considered along with other hydraulic systems modi-
4
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fications now being contemplated.
6. Ejection seat tests (sled tests) should be completed for
velocities up to launch speeds before the first manned flight of the
Orbiter 101 on the 747.
7. The landing gear system is critical and system ground tests
are essential Lo confidence in the time and certainty of drop. The
Panel feels that nose gear shimmy is as critical as extension. Nose
gear shimmy will be checked eat the contractor and NASA's Langley Re-
search Cen ,.er before free flight. The program feels a more pressing
concern is the completion of the qualification test with static loads
and the test of the nose gear door thruster on the simulator. The
Panel recommendation is that management review the requirements and
results of the certification program.
8. The Panel has consistently emphasized that a "tail fairing
Off" flight is one of the most persuasive reasons for the ALT program.
This test should not be scrubbed for the reason of further need for the
101 vehicle. It should only be scrubbed if it is determined that buffet
levels on the 747 are too high for safety and no alternative method of
running the test can be devised.
. In this respect we again note the fact that the ALT test pro-
gram is so success oriented that any major problem, causing delay, might
well suggest curtailment of ALT. We realize that 101 is to go to Marshall
on a tight schedule, but would be concerned if meeting that schedule (or
others) resulted in cancellation of tailcone-off flights or the scheduled
tailcone-on flights. One step that can be taken is to assure immediate
16
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analysis of data attar each ALT Plight so as to permit rational de-
r	 cisions before the next Plight. This may permit consolidation of
test objectives on one or more of the tailcone -on flights, thus pro-
viding time For tailcone-off Plights. Prompt data reduction and anal-
ysis will also provide opportunities for the crews to integrate re-
vised procedures in the simulator prior to next flight. The Panel
a
understands that JSC is aware of and addressing this need.
Y
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ORBITER 102
A. OBSERVATIONS
The Orbiter vehicle scheduled for the Orbital Flight Test (OFT)
program is now proceeding through design evaluation, manufacturing and
assembly. During this past year the panel focused on the progress of
such critical syhtems as the flight control system, avionics, the ex-
ternal thermal protection system and the electrical power and environ-
mental control system.
Our assessment of the flight control system was outlined in our
discussion of the system for ALT. Our basic observation is that more
significant modifications may be required for OFT than the make work
changes for ALT. These are discussed in the reconuwndation.
While there are challenges to certifying the avionics system for
ALT, the Panel feels the more significant challenges are in the certi-
fication of the system for OFT. During the year the better definition
of software requirements pointed up the fact that while the current
system would support ALT it would not support FOF without drastic cur-
tailment of FOF's enhanced requirements or, conversely, an enlargement
of the computer memory. This situation led to a decision to design and
build a new computer with an expanded memory called "double density."
While this decision does not necessarily imply that entirely new and
different software must be built, it will be important to make as much
use of the ALT programs and test results as is possible in order to
h
establish confidence in the avionics system for FOF. This could well
turn out to be a future schedule constraint if not carefully monitored.	
It
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The design and manufacturing of the thermal, protection system
underwent major review this past year. Decisions have been made on the
basic materials, coatings, optical properties and waterproofing pro-
cesses required for each of the three types of insulation. The process
to produce tiles of the desired properties seem to have jelled and the
production facilities will be on line. The question about the capabil-
ity to deliver follow-up sets in the desired short time still remains
since the production of one set takes a year. The method of installing
and bonding tiles in blocks or arrays of 160 to 200 tiles has merit.
The problem of installing close-out tiles between arrays has also been
solved. Earlier discrepancies in tolerances of some important dimen-
sions have been resolved now that there is an improved flow of infor-
mation between all the involved parties. The flatness of the coated
surface of the tiles is defined and achievable in the manufacturing
process. The radius of the rim of .060 inches is obtained by a simple
chamferring and the subsequent flow of the coatings in the manufacturing
process.
Testing is probably the biggest challenge at the moment. Fail-
ures of different test configurations under varying environments indi-
cate tae need for continued evaluation of the many different tile arrange-
ments to assure they meet minimum requirements. Time to verify critical details
is limited. Funding constraints last year caused a reduction in testing
and may force a curtailing of testing again this year. The certification
activity for all TPS design details needs special attention and rigorous
screening before the first OFT. Due to lead time involved in updating
19
test articles, test articles sometimes do not represent the final
vehicle configuration. Validity of these tests for the purpose of
certification therefore would be questionable.
It is obvious to the Panel that the most critical feature of the
surface heat protection system is the assurance of closure and the in-
tegrity of the surface temperature protection system at the vlosure
edges or hinges. Tile current major problem being addressed by program
management to the configuration of the olevon hinges. The Panel agrees
with the approach of having dual heat protection at the control surface
hinges. The Panel has noted that efforts are being made to plan tests
of the equivalent of hinge configurations and door edge mismatches or
gaps in an environment approaching that of reentry. If such simulations
can be achieved the Panel would support such tests enthusiastically.
There are two other areas to which the Panel will give particular
attention in the coming year.
The JSC Technical Assessment Office has presented an analysis of
the control capability for the reentry phase of the mission that shows
a sufficiently narrow margin of controllability. The Panel will
follow carefully all further analyses and subsonic correlation of
flight dgta. If aerodynamic control margins deteriorate further re-
design may need to be considered.
History on fuel cells for electrical power has been sufficiently
good that nearly all reviewers put complete reliance on the concept.
The Panel does not question the selection of the electrical sources
themselves but does note that electrical power is vulnerable to a
20
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congential failure. The Panel will continue to review the fuel cells
and members will review how the three cells are utilized when one or
more shut-downs must be accommodated. Our comments on the environmental
control system are more in the form of recommendations to provide back-
{ up to what appears to be good systems.
R. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Panel is particularly concerned that the condept of par-
allel or tandem multiple chamber pistons for elevon actuation be seri-
ously considered for incorporation in the planned modification of the
control system. If adoption of such a revised control system should
be elected, the design and development program would need to be started
immediately.
2. The rudder/speed brake actuation system deserves a thorough
review for vulnerability to single point failure. For instance, a
failure in one of the motors used to position the rudder speed brake
could cause an overload on an adjacent motor causing the failure of all
the motors in a zipper fashion.
3. Increasing the APU fuel capacity on Orbiter 102 sh-ald be
seriously considered.
4. , The concept of hydraulic control of the main engines needs a
critical review both for the ettect on the hydraulic system and to ascer-
tain that the operation of the main engines is not subject to shut down
due to "service" system failures when the engine itself is still operable.
Inherent in such a reassessment should be a review of the desirability
and potential methods for isolating the engine control system after the
21
main enSines have fulfilled their function.
S. The Panel would recommend that the new computer development
with the double density memory system be closely monitored to as to
assure the maximum computability with the present hardware and soft-
ware. This will insure a backlog of experience from ALT to aid in
the verification of the software programs for the new computer.
6. Currently there is very little experience to predict the be-
havior of the thermal protection system in hypersonic flow and there-
fore the system cannot be certified by similarity or analysis. Among
the areas that are particularly unpredictable are:
as	 The gap configurations in width, its direction with re-
gard to the surface flow.
b.	 The steps between tile and its tripping influence on the
boundary layer into turbulence.
Co	 Flow in door seal cavities and gaps.
There will be a multitude of sub-size tiles interfacing the HRSI with
the RCL of the nose-cap and the leading edge segments. These tiles
will probably behave differently from the standard size tiles in the
airflow. Therefore, the behavior of the patchwork surface and the
effects of surface condition, gaps, or steps, etc. still appear to need
test exposure to the environment for valid certification.
7. The HRSI insulated umbilical doors are exposed to the flight
environment on ascent. After separation the doors will be closed.
There is no inspection mode or access planned to assure a proper closure.
Consideration should be given to an on orbit inspection and repair of
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the TPS and particularly the umbilical door seals to assure a safe
reentry.
S. The currently developed engineering criteria for TPS coating
erosion and inspection method should include access feasibility studies.
.
	
	
9.	 The integrity of the aluminum structure after any flight de-
pends on the cooling efficiency of the GSS equipment after landing
and the novel design of cooling ducts to prevent the orbiter structure
from excessive temperatures. The design and implementation of such a
cooling duct system has not yet been certified by a total system test
and should be.
	
10.	 It appears that, as a result of a good reliability history,
the maintenance of cabin atmosphere integrity has been based on a "two
engine" concept. This has the practical result that any failure will
cause the termination of a mission in order to protect the crew from a
subsequent single failure. This suggests that systems which must last
through the total time of a mission probably should be augmented so
that such single failures do not force mission termination for safety.
11. The flash evaporator used to supplement radiator cooling is
of the "fail safe" variety like the environmental system where a single
failure will abort the mission in order to maintain safety. A policy
should be considered to insure that such system failures will not abort
extensive missions in the name of safety.
t
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MAIN ENGINE
A. OBSERVATIONS
Development of the Main Engine is, as most everyone is aware, be-
hind schedule. The SSME Critical Design Review was hold in Sep4ember
1976. Because of development problems, particularly in turbomachinery,
a number of milestones that were to have been met prior to the CDR had
not been achieved. Since than much progress has been made in solving
the turbomachinery problems and rated power levels have been reached.
Significant improvements have been made in pump performance. Suction
performance of the pumps is yet to be demonstrated. The long-lead
parts of the turbo machinery have been released for production. In
some instances, backup designs have been released in parallel with the
baseline design. With respect to design and performance, the situation
is much better than it was a year ago. While considerable progress has
been made, the SSME was from four to six months behind its schedule as
of late February 1977.
Mere then is our assessment of the major elements of the engine
system. As noted, the turbomachinery has been the most troublesome
portion of the engine development to date. The problems encountered
include subsynchronous whirl and turbine bearing problems in the i{PFTP,
performance problems in all rotating machinery and, most recently,
significant turbine tip scat erosion in the high pressure fuel and
oxidizer pumps.
Stiffening of the HPFTP shaft and a modification to the cooling
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system for the turbine bearing have permitted the achievement of RPL
for up to 61 secondv. All told, about 132 seconds of operation at RPL
has been accumulated. It would appear that the whirl and bearing prob-
lems have been brought under control. Significantly longer and re-
peated testing is requireu, however, to confirm these observations and
provide confidence in the design.
Performance of the pumps and turbines has been improved by de-
creasing tip clearances, underfiling impellers, and impeller and volute
charges. The improved performance has been demonstrated on the dis-
charge side of the pumps. Yet to be demonstrated is the suction per-
formance of most of the pumps. A new engine power balance is to be
available in mid-March. At this time it will be possible to determine
whether the turbo-machinery performance has improved sufficiently to
satisfy engine system requirements. It is characteristic of the cycle
employed in the SSME that the performance interactions among the pumps
are strong so that an assessment as to adequacy of performance must be
made at the engine system level.
The turbine tip seal degradation is being attacked by a seal ma-
terials change. Indications are that the use of Bradalloy in the HPFTP
may provide a fix. Doing the same to the turbine seal of the RPOTP is
being considered.
At the time of the CDR, a potentially serious materials problem
had surfaced concerning the low-cycle fatigue properties of Incoloy 903.
Recently acquired data indicated significantly lower low-cycle fatigue
life than had been used for design. Also, data from two sources did
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not agree. Since then, additional material properties data have boon
obtained and a reassessment of design assumptions, especially operating
e,empr.ttures, has been conducted. It appears that the reason for the
disagreement of Lite data is now understood. Sufficient conservatism
was used in tits initial design assumptions so that, upon reassessment
in detail, all but four engine components have satisfactory predicted
life. These four are under yet more detailed scrutiny and it appears
that any required redesign will be relatively minor.
The 77.5:1 area ratio flight nozzle has been tested both at COCA
raid and on the A-2 stand at NSTL. Nita that have been reduced thus Car
indicate that performance is within expected bounds.
Tests of the heat exchanger have begun at NSTL. Thus far, no
difficulty has been encountered and early data indicate performance to
be close to design predictions. The combustion systems are in excellent
shape and stability testing has been completed satisfactorily. Heat
transfer is measured to be within design boundaries.
Much of the auxiliary equipment: has completed DVS testing. What
remains to be done is on, or close to, schedule.
The controller is still performing well in the field. A firm
baseline configuration has been established and unit pb is being built
to that configuration. It will be the qualification unit.
Controller software is on a very tight schedule with Block I re-
quired for MFT. At present about seven percent memory margin is avail-
able.
,ay 4
Although recent engine system tests had to be aborted because of
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temperature spikes during startup, a 61 second run at RPL was accom-
plished March 12th. Minor modifications to the sequence may be necessary
to assure this problem is resolved.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. There are no specific recommendations at this time on resolving
the existing problem since the engine development problems are well re-
cognized by the proper levels of management and solutions are being
sought and evaluated. However, the deadline is near whet, sustained
engine running time at rated power levels and start transients to all
high power levels must be attained if current milestones for major tests
and the certification for first orbital flight are to be met. The start-
up and turbine tip seal problems must be solved quickly so that long-
duration runs may be achieved over the range of power levels. Repeat-
ability of performance in meeting test objectives and consistency of
performance from engine to engine must be demonstrated within the near
term in order to not impact the overall Shuttle schedule.
2. If these requirements are not met in a timely fashion the pro-
gram will, of course, face important judgments as to hew to guarantee
the necessary test time to certify the engines for manned orbital flight.
As noted - in last year's Annual Report, the planned test program called
for fifty - six hours of engine testing in Final Flight Configuration
which compares favorably with the test time accumulated on the Saturn
F-1 and F - 2 engines. Contingency or recovery planning must provide
management either the realistic schedule to meet such an objective or
1
i
e
the significance of any deviations from that goal in term of the effect
on the basis for confidence in the flightreadiness of the engine.
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SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
A. OBSERVATIONS
During this past year the Panel has focused on the Solid Rocket
Motor (SRM) as the most significant component, while a minimum of time
has been spent on other components. Other program areas examined by
the Panel include test and risk assessments associated with the develop-
ment and operational use of the SRB.
The Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) includes a number of vital functional
components beside; the basic rocket propellant and cases which form the
majority of the weight and volume. The SRM nozzle, which has a diameter
of 54.43 inches at the throat section, is designed to be gimballed or
deflected for attitude control of the total Shuttle system during ascent.
This U ton, 13 foot long nozzle requires a flexible bearing which is
constructed of alternate layers of elastomeric rubber and steel. The
hydraulic supply system, including the auxiliary power unit and hy-
draulic pump, drives the thrust vector control or nozzle gimballing
system.
M
The separation system, to separate the SRB from the ET during
ascent, utilizes separation rocket motors and control system that must
operate on time and within performance requirements to assure total
and clean separation. The recovery system is all important to the
required reuse of the SRB element of the total Shuttle system.
Among the major management events this past year was completion
of the Solid Rocket Booster Critical Design Review (CDR), in December
	 1
k
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1976 rather than the originally scheduled August 1977 because of the
very good progress that has been made in the design/development of the
SRd overall and component parts.
This period also saw the selection of an overall assembly con-
tractor with Marshall now assuming the same project management role as
it has en the External Tank and Main Engine projects.
As for management at the contractor, the SRM project at the Wasatch
Division of the Thiokol Corporation has been given a very high status in
the company organization. The SDI Project Director reports directly to
the Divison Vice President and General Manager. The project team con-
sists of about 45 people including those few in the field operations
at NASA Centers. Engineering, test, administrative and other critical
personnel are then drawn from the 2,300 people available at the plant
on an as required basis to form functional areas within the project
team. Our discussions with the Thiokol personnel and the Marshall pro-
gram administration and technical groups indicates that the Wasatch
Division is staffed by experienced technical people at all levels.
The NASA resident office is staffed by competent people doing an
excellent job.
Elements of product assurance in .chieving a reliable SKM include:
(a) emphasizing the fact that this is tc , be a "manrated" system, (b)
elimination of historical failure modes, and (c) sustaining personnel
motivation. Thiokol reorganize.i so that product assurance is a single
cohesive group. They are following the hazard identification and risk
assessment system in use throughout the Shuttle program. This also
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holds true for supplier controls and auditing systems. They are dis-
posing of approximately twenty material review board actions a week
at this time. This is expected to increase as the pace of fabrication
increases. It does not seem excessive now.
Thiokol bas a contract with KSC to examine the hazards and risks
associated with operating in VAB during the Space Shuttle build-up for
flight. A first progress report was given to KSC personnel by Thiokol
on September 30, 1976.	 It consists of three components: (a) propellant
ignitibility testing and propagation testing, (b) outline of process com-
pliance and hazard identification including probability of occurrence,
and (c) consequences of ignition and recommendations (plume definition,
exhaust composition, building involvement, and propagation control).
Much of the technology used in the Solid Rocket Motor has been
demonstrated on previous programs and thus provide a good basis of
confidence in this program.
To date over 250,000,000 pounds of the propellant used in the SRM
has been produced for Minuteman motors and many others. It is basically
the same with changes in the quantity of iron oxide which is used to
control the burning rate. The higher the iron oxides the higher the
burning'rate in pounds per minute. Aging during storage has been demon-
strated not to affect the viability of the propellant. Thiokol has held
some 40,000 pounds in storage for over 13 years and when fired has met
all specifications.
The case material, which is D6AC modified carbon steel has seen
extensive use in rocket motor and aircraft applications because it has
i
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a relatively high strength and very good fracture toughness. It has
been estimated that for each use or firing of the SRM the case wall
thickness will be reduced by 0.00024 inches. which allows for a total
of 20 firing# (19 refurbishments for operational use).
1
The aft 4^ feet of the SRM nozzle, aft of a field splice.is severed
by a linear shaped charge during the return of the SRB to the water by
parachute. This segment is discarded so that the load on the structure
is reduced to acceptable levels upon impingement in the ocean. Similar
configurations have been demonstrated on a 156-inch motor program for
the Poseidon missile.
The design safety factors for the multi.-use SRM compare favorably
with the ICBM. An extensive experience base exists for the character-
ization of materials and the use of fabrication processes that provides
confidence that SRM as a whole and its components should experience a
minimum of problems as they progress through the testing program.
Our other observations can be summarized as follows;
1. Two successful tests have been completed using the full-
scale flexible bearings.
2. The Contractor is using the vacuum casting system used on
the Minuteman program which has never had a motor rejected.
3. SRM cleaning and refurbishing procedures and methods are based
on experience gained from USAF programs.
4. Personnel assigned to this program by the contractor have
an average of 13 years of such experience.
5. The contractor and MSFC continue to actively study the
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precautions necessary to assure full -time safe handling of the SRM's
through every stage of the factory, delivery and installation activ-
ities.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Many important tests are to be conducted within the next few months,
and should be the focus of attention by technical management. These
tests include the first development firing of the SRM, the conduct of
the "All-Up Engineering Integrated Verification Test," and many of the
qualification tests. Our recommendations simply identify significant
i
areas that need to be monitored during the test and analysis period.
1. The SRM, as in other areas of the SRB total assembly, are
affected by the system aerothermodynamic loads. These latest data
must be factored into the analysis and test as soon as practical to
assure proper mc:rgins are maintained in the structures and other crit-
ical areas.
2. The nozzle bearing boot, although it has passed some tests,
is not out of the woods as yet. There are concerns with regard to
assuring that maximum material temperatures are not exceeded during
the firing time and that no splits or openings occur allowing hot gas
4
flow inside the bearing.
3. The Auxiliary Power Unit has experienced some "under perform-
ance" tests which require a reexamination and review to define the manner
in which the performance and reliability of these important units can
A
be upgraded.
4. The use of the RDX linear shaped charge to sever the aft end y
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of the SRM nozzle is a concern from the viewpoint of premature ignition.
The temperatures and their duration would suggest that this item might
be classed as a Category 1 hazard and treated accordingly.
5.	 The data returned from the first Orbital Flight Test mission,
the first time the total SRB system will be tested as part of a total
Shuttle system, will be crucial in defining the margins the SRB makes
available to the total system. Since the SRB's must work each and
every time, the flight test instrumentation, its location, etc. must
be thoughtfully considered. Where transducers are placed into bosses
they must be fail-safe. in other words the DFT must not be thought of
as simply an "ad4..-on" subsystem.
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EXTERNAL, TANK
A. Oa S^A1IONS
The Panel has been reviewing such areas of the program as (1) the
effects of new Shuttle system aerothermodynamic loads, (2) availability
of hardware for the major Mated Vertical Ground Vibration Test. and Main
Propulsion Test, (3) manufacturing and welding problems, and (4) the
assessment of ET hazards and their significance for the integrated
Shuttle system.
Launch and ascent aerothermal analyses have been updated recently
and there appears to be some effects on design and/or margins. For
example, the LOX feedline bellows and bellows support, electrical
cable trays anti the forward LH2 dome cap requires "beef-up" or material
changes. The higher vibration levels affect instrumentation and vent
valves. Ibis may result in further differences between :...in Propulsion
'Pest Articles and Mated Vehicle Ground Vibration Test articles.
As for manufacturing there has been a changeover from the type of
vertical welding fixtures used for the Saturn V S-1-C cases to a hori-
zontal type. Practically all weld fixtures are now in use and this is
a period of learning when adjustments and improvements will have to
be made to assure the quality of the manufactured pieces. Among the
problems that will have to be solved are balancing the hardware and
proper motion control and achievement of weldiv g gap consistency. The
problems normal to the learning curve will be solved in time and the
observance and control of all the variables will produce useable quality 	 `,
F
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hardware.
,.
There are additional fixtures and tooling to be introduced, tested
and adjusted. During this process problems will occur. For instance,
problems might be expected with the automatic TPS spray-on equipment
and the process to obtain a relatively smooth outer-surface for the
cylindrical portions of the tank as well as for both insulated end
domes. The forward dome, exposed to higher dynamic pressure will be
sensitive to surface discontinuities.
The Panel continues to follow the activities of the safety, re-
liability and quality assurance activities and their handling of major
safety concerns. We have been giving particular attention to the hand-
ling of the risk from the presence of wiring, in the LOX tank. Teflon
insulated wire used for point level sensor assemblies is in direct con-
tact with liquid and gaseous oxygen within the tank. Currently, the
contractor is conducting development tests or. these wires and other
high temperature replacements to ascertain their properties under ex-
pected off-nominal (high) environments.
Also, the Panel has been following the handling of the hazard from
ice building up on ET protuberances prior to launch and the effect of
ice breaking off during launch and ascent when it could damage the
Orbiter Thermal Protection system.
B.	 RECOMMENDATIONS
1.	 Consideration should be given to contingency planning or
success Assurance. The spray-on insulation is not expected to be
machined over. What then would be done with an application that is
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too thick for the spec because of a breakdown of a spray gun or block-
age of the nozzles.
2. Additional management control should be considered for the
ET-Orbiter interface. There is no plan for a mock-up or separation
test with a complete hi-fidelity mock-up. Another concern that needs
additional assessment is the possible damage to the Tank caused by the
separation dynamic impact loads and subsequent endangering of She
Orbiter.
3. Additional effort to determine the adequacy of the present!
ET/SRB attachment struts may be warranted if present struts do not
attenuate pyro separation impact loads. There are no shock absorp-
tion devices on the ET-side of the interface.
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RISK MANAGPMNT
A. OBSZRVA_TI21S
The Panel has been following the methods used by program manage-
.	 ment to assess the risk level inherent in any endeavor an experimental
and as demanding as the Shuttle System and cominends the continuing
attention being paid by the program to controlling these risks.
During this reporting period the Panel focused on such specific
elements of the risk management system as rick assessment, configur-
ation management and parts quality control. The risk assessment system
provides a means for taking identified hazards, assessing their con-
sequences and determining their disposition. Configuration management
assures that the flight hardware as built and tested is as designed
and therefore the design hazard analysis reflects the real hazards in
the system. The review of parts control focused on the use of counter-
feit electronic parts to assure they do not degrade the safety of the
design.
The review of the risk assessment also considered the role and
work of 4he Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Screening
Ccmmittge in deciding what risks should be brought to management's
attention. This led to the expansion of the committee to include the
NASA Headquarters' Director of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assur-
ance and a Panel member as an observer. This supports the group in a
broader view of its responsibility and encourages a more effective
voice in resolving risk and hazard problems.
.*
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At the Panel's suggestion the committee is audiMJng the handling
of safety concerns not brought to management's attention because they
are considered minor. The audit is done through the random selection
of safety concerns which are not considered serious enough at that
point in time to be placed in the open concern list. This permits a
testing of the population of problems to see if any serious ones have
been overlooked. The Last sampling of the 500+ concerns consisted of
twenty selected at random. The screening board found ojily one that
was possibly close to becoming an open concern. The Safety, Reliability
and Quality Assurance organisation will in the next few weeks review all
500 concerns to see if any should be upgraded.
The procedures of the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
Screening Committee have been changed to include a meeting of the group
two weeks prior to the first captive flight with a manned active Orbiter.
Representatives of the project and program offices, support personnel,
f	 and engineering design group and others would be invited to participate
i
in the pre-review. The purpose is to minimize the possibility of some-
thing having been missed that might bite the program later on and to
minimize the chance of a surprise. In short, it amounts to a recheck
of the risks and hazards in either system integration or design charac-
teristics. The Panel encourages this effort.
The Panel became concerned about published reports which discussed
the possible use of bogus parts in electronic equipment, and conducted
a review of the steps taken to resolve this problent.
Tests have been run on "counterfeit" parts found in the load con-
4
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troller#. These parts indicate that the problem is not one of quality,
but one of purchasing procedure or specification. If, indeed, "re-
jected" parts were relabeled, appropriate action against the vendor
shou.d be instituted.
The program's response is that the best method of assuring that
component parts are adequate for their intended purposes on the Shuttle
Program is to assure that all flight components are exposed to the
expected flight environments for the expected mission times prior to
the first approach and landing (PAL). These tests are required whether
counterfeit or non-counterfeit parts are used; also, they will ensure
that any unsuspected counterfeit parts that are in the vehicle will
adequately meet the program requirements. If the results of investi-
gative efforts to determine the source of parts relabeling are suffi-
cient to make a case, appropriate action against that vendor will be
instituted.
in addition to these -.)pecific reviews the Panel continued to mon-
itor and counsel on the evolution of the technical assessment groups
and the system for aggregate risk assessment.
The Panel encouraged the establishment of technical assessment
groups at each manned flight center to contribute to the "check and
balance" function in the risk management system. As noted in last
year's report, these groups can either trouble-shoot pressing prob-
lems in terms of schedule impact, ecc, or i.hey can focus on identifying
problems that are significant for the program's understanding of both
specific risks and aggregate risk. Both roles are valuable but the
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Panel favors the second one. It is, of course, important that these
groups have the freedom to choose and pursue their own areas of in-
vestigation so their reports are in fact independent evaluations. The
r
Panel has monitored the activities of the team at JSC and found that
they appear to have this freedom and use it effectively to review
critical areas and thus are making a significant contribution to the
program.
There is general agreement that an appropriate statement of aggre-
gate or total risk is a valuable senior management tool. A constant
awareness provides incentives for accepting new ideas to diminish such
risks and might encourage all who had systems responsibility to suggest
means of coping with such hazards should they occur.	 Such a statement
in the Panel's opinion would include the accepted risks and those risks
being resolved.
The-Panel has been working with the system for preparing aggregate
risk since the Apollo days when it proposed the mission safety assess-
ment documents to aid management decision making on those critical
flights. This is the background for saying that while the concept of
total risk is simple the task of defining and profiling aggregate risk
is complex for a number of reasons. This past year senior program
management has taken a fresh look at the systems and their own require-
means for visibility and revised the system.
B. RRCOMNDATIONS
ti
1.	 The Panel recognizes the accomplishments of both senior pro-
gram and Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance management and their
40
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continuing efforts to define and determine aggregate risk in a manner
most useful to senior management. Ilia current system provides a great
deal of risk information, but the challenge is to assure it in a useful
tool for the decision-makers on the Shuttle program. Mission hazard
analyses were made on prior manned space missions to show those safety
concerns which would constrain a mission until resolved. In this way
they were providing the aggregate risk based on the best available in-
formation which was examined from objective and subjective viewpoints.
The ALT project safety assessment report has essentially done this as
noted by this statement "The JSC Safety Division considers Lite aggregate
risk acceptable, based on the assessment of safety concerns to (late,
considering the accepted risks and the actions being accomplished to re-
solve open items." Perhaps what is needed are detailed presentations
to management by project a'ad sub-system engineers its well as safety,
reliability and quality assurance engineers so that statements made in
mission safety analyses allows management to 	 selectively review the
background for specific Shuttle flights.
2. As noted the Lechnical assessment group aL JSC is off to a
good start and shows that 
it 
can make a significant contribution to
risk management. Since their continued effectiveness now depends upon
the level of support and direct interest by senior program management
the Panel makes a point of recommending such personal attention.
3. The effectiveness of configuration management depends upon
the implementation of the system as described to the Panel. Thor(- !, fore,
the Panel recommends that audits of the operation of the system con-
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tinue to be brought to management's attention during this period of
development testing, checkout to assure the "as-built" and "as-tested"
reflects the "as-designed" systems. This applies to both hardware and
software.
4.	 The Panel agrees with the program investigation that the
quality of small electronic parts in the Shuttle is adequate, and
would suggest that in the procurement of this class of parts that re-
liance be placed on the performance specification rather than brand
name.
4
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APPENDIX A
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND STACE ADMINISTRATION
CY 1976 ANNUAL COMPRSIiCNSIVE REVIEW
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
The Panel held its annual meeting on July 23,
1976 in Washington to present the observations and reconnn.ndations in
its Annual Report before the Administrator and Depuiy Administrator
with membees, of the congressional staffs and aerospace media in atten-
dance. One result of this approach was that the Aerospace Daily, which
is widely read in the aerospace community, gave prominent coverage to
the Panel's assessment.
The volumes of the Annual Report to the NASA Administrator include:
Volume I - Observations and Conclusions (111 pages)
Volume II - Summary of Information Developed in the
Panel's Fact-Finding Activities (308 pages)
The Panel, through its inspection trips, requires program
management at both NASA. and contrcctor 'Levels to review and explicitly
explain their technical management systems and decision making process,
the basis for confidence in crew safety, and the rationale for risks
that have had to be accepted. This approach reinforces decision mak-
ing that minimizes crew risk. It also serves to assure problems are
worked early and at the lowest appropriate management level. The Panel
reports to the Administrator and Congress and provides them independent
assessment and substantial information that aids them in their over-
sight responsibility. These reports keep before senior manned flight
management's attention issues critical to crew safety. And because
these reports are timely and public, they add to the public's informed
understanding and the development of appropriate criteria of public
accountability.
The following paragraphs illustrate the value of the Panel's
approach and sonic of their contributions to agency policy formulation,
program-planning, decision making, an.: the accomplishment of program
objectives more efficiently and economically. Substantially more de-
tail is in the attachment containing the Panel's recommendations on
Shuttle and the program's response.
The Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of
Representatives is one of the committees exercising oversight of the
Panel. They noted in their "Space Shuttle. 1977 Status Report" that:
"The annual report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel (ASAP), a group appointed by the Administrator
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part of the approval cycle for Level II and III documents pertain-
ing to his area of responsibility to assure effective program inte-
gration.
Proms gram Pianning cnd Accgmplisttment of Program Objectives
MA^EFfeecct; vely. One of the key rc ln s of the Panel is toalert
management to upcoming challenges so they will be able to give them
the appropriate attention and resources. In its assessment of the
hydraulic system in the June 1975 Annual Report (Volume I, Page 5),
the Panel `uggested "that management review once again the following
areas to assure there is an adequate basis for eonfide ►uee for crew
safety in the use of single actuator on the orbiter elevens." The
more detailed assessment (Volume II, Pages 69-71) raised questions
about the hydraulic system. Subsequent test results lent support to
the need for this review and redesigns have been instituted for the
systems that will fly on the orbiter in CY 1977 and more extensive
changes for the system that will be used on orbital flights.
Program planning and accomplishment of objectives can be
more efficient if past experience from related programs is effectively
used. Therefore, the Panel suggested and the program agreed that per-
sonnel with experience in lifting body flights be asked to participate
in the Shuttle training aircraft program to train Orbiter crews.
Agency Management Decision Making. One of the continuing
objectives of decision making is to reduce risks whenever and where-
ever possible. This means management needs timely visibility into
risks that are being accepted so they can assess whether the decision
process is sound. it also means that management needs to have a timely
reminder of significant risks so that (a) current decisions or trade-
offs to minimize a current risk in one area does not increase the
risk in another area, and (b) as new options to reduce previously
accepted risks become apparent they are recognized and acted upon by
management. Thus the Panel proposed and senior program management
implemented a system of continuing and regular reviews for senioe
space flight management by the reliability, quality and safety per-
sonnel who act as a check and balance on the program.
Another area that the Panel has reviewed is the system for
accepting "minor risks" by working level personnel since these are not
part of senior management's review. The objective is to assure that
these risks have been properly assessed and dispositioned. Thus a
Panel proposed that the risk screening board audit by sampling the
handling of minor risks. This approach was adopted and a Panel member
and the Dire^Anr of Reliability, Quality and Safety monitor the ac-
tivities of the Board.
Achievement of Economies in the Program. The Panel through
its questioning and assessments aids management in identifying those
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priorities that are most significant for crew safety and mission
success. This aids them in allocating resources to appropriate pri-
orities and thus helps assure the most economical use of resources*
it is not feasible to expect such information from other
advisory groups because they are not pri ainally concerned with crew
safety. To compare the Panel with line and staff organizations, its
membership is composed of senior executives (a) experienced in managing
large development programs and risk control, (b) sensitive to the re-
quirements of public accountability, and (c) capable of providing a
fresh look and independent judgment needed in a "check and balance"
function.
The Panel's budget is $142 8 000. The increase over prior years
is principally because the members rate of compensation was increased
by Congress to bring it up to the level paid other NASA consultants.
This was an act of equity by Congress since the Panel members rate had
not changed in the eight years of the Panel's existence and they had
been accepting a rate of compensation about two-thirds of what other
consultants were. This had been recognized and accepted by the Panel
but became an embarrassment when a NASA consultant was asked to join
the Panel because of his expertise and had to accept a reduction in
rate of compensation.
Panel members are selected principally in terms of (a) their
operating and executive experience with development programs, (b) their
experience with, and sensitivity to, the accountability requirements
of senior public officials, and (c) their non-involvement in the pro-
gram under review. All of the current members have a background in
research, and development management and have worked with government
programs at senior levels of accountability.
The Panel was established by Congress in Public Law 90-67
and has been intimately involved in the oversight of the later Apollo
program, Skylab, and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. Currently it is
working on Shuttle and will have a considerable workload through the
developpent and early operational phases. It reinforces management
attention to crew safety and works with management at NASA and its
contractors to identify
 and resolve the risks inherent in a develop-
ment program. Through its reports it aids NASA senior management and
Congress in their oversight roles and provides the public extensive
data for an informed understanding of program development and crew
safety. It is unique in the NASA management system because it offers
the experience of senior executives reviewing both policy and operating
activities with a fresh loot, and independence of judgment needed in a
"check and balance" or oversight function.
The objective, or criterion for organizing the Panel's work-
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load, is to assure that management for vehicle development and mission
operations adequately provides for crew and ground safety. Therefore",
given the current stage of vehicle development, the Panel will concen-
trate on detailed oversight of the design, manufacturing and grounI
test activities For Orbiter 1 and 2 and the :associated elements and
provide appropriate reports for program and agency management. Also,
the Panel will provide detailed oversight as mission planning for the
early te.=4 flights evolve. Then the Pfoal 411 focus on launch and
mission pre,arations and provide mission readiness assessments to aid
agency management in their decision making.
I
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APPENDIX B
NASA's Response to Comments
made in the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report
on the Space Shuttle Program
dated June, 1976
•	 page 3, Para. I.I.A.
Comment: There is no margin in the schedule to accommodate
major perturbations.
Res onse: Space Shuttle schedules have been developed to
prov a the proper balance concerning the amount of schedule
time that could serve as contingency periods to accommodate
developsient problems. Current Space Shuttle schedules do
allow for normal perturbations as have been experienced in
some instances to date with no impact to the overall schedule.
To maintain large blocks of contingency time would be costly
and inefficient. The Shuttle test program is designed to
serve as verification of results obtained by other means
(e.g., math modelling) so that any major problems will be
identified early in the program.
•	 Page 5, Para. 1.II.A.1
Comment: Senior management will need to monitor: 1) the
a i ty to meet minimum requirements where there are further
reductions or changes in the major test program.
Ream^s on^se: Our review process insures that senior management
is Informed on major test program 4rtatus and changes. This
includes periodic reviews with the Program Director and
Associate Administrator for Space Flight, and the establish-
ment of ad hoc teams when special reviews are felt to be
warranted (e.g., Space Shuttle acoustics testing, structural
testing). The Management Council is also apprised of signifi-
cant issues and used as a review forum for programmatic
changes. Finally major test status and requirement changes
are reviewed with the Administrator.
0	 Page 6, Para. 1.II.A.3
Comment: Senior management will need to monitor the realism
of pans and schedules for the remaining tests where there
are significant problems so that decisions can be made early
rather than under schedule pressure.
Response:  The Shuttle management reviews schedules and pro-
gram progress on a continuing basis in order to judge their
realism and to identify areas where increased attention may
be required. No will continue to monitor this activity
closely.
URIGINAL PAGE IS 
as
or POOR QUALITY	 1, )tECEDING PACE BLANK NOT FILMED
Page 6, Para . 1.21.3.1
omment s An area that warrants review now to the data
required from ALT to support a flight readiness decision on
the first orbital flights and therefore the current mission
planning to obtain these data.
Response: Careful management attention has been applied to
enrification of the data required from ALT to support
a flight readiness decision for the first orbital frights
and (2) the ALT flight planning required to obtain these
data. This attention is evident in numerous program docu-
ments. Volume rit e Flight Operations, of JSC 07700, Program
Definition and Requirements, relates the ALT objectives to
the verification of capability for orbital flight. Space
Shuttle Program Directives SA, Flight Test Reqquirements, and
36, Mission evaluation Requirements, are in effect to estab-
lish requirements for cross exchange of data. Further, ALT
Flight Test Requirements (?TRs) have been developed to state
logically the ALT data required to lift specific constraints
against the ALT and OFT programs. The implementation of
these directives in mission planning will continue to receive
full management attention.
•	 Page 6, Para.1.I2.8.2
Comment: An area that warrants review now is the aggregate
rr saMharant in the "first flight" plan to assure it re-
mains at an acceptable level.
Rasponsee: ALT flight operations planning is under constant
programmatic review. The risks associated with an individual
flight are assessed to a large degree by the Flight Techniques
Panel and reviewed by the Flight Crew Safety Panel, the Flight
Test Program Panel, the Flight Operations Panel, and the
Operations Integration Review and Range Safety Management
processes. In particular, the Flight Crew Safety Panel will
review all flight test safety issues on a re^ular basis to
include the *first flight" risks. Further, first flight"
plan verifications will be accomplished using the Orbiter
aeroflight simulator and the Shuttle Training Aircraft.
•	 Page 6, Pare.1.11.3.3
Commant: The basis for eonfidance that the structural eapa-
b3C=y  of the 717 tail section will not be overloaded during
tailcone off flights and that vibrations will not exceed crew
tolerance.
Sash nse: Based on extensive wind tunnel test and analysis
y Boeing and awkwsil International, it has been established
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that the structural capability of the 747 tail suction will
not be exceeded during tailcone off flights. She situation
with regard to 747 crew tolerance is not conclusive. To
conclusively establish the acceptability of full length tail-
cone off flights, it is planned to conduct precursor anted
tailcone off taxi and flight tests. The results from %,hose
tests will be utilized in waking a final decision on whether
to conduct the full length tailcone off flights. •afety wi.1
be a paramount consideration in the decision.
Page 6, Para. 1.22.11.4
Comment: The test requirements and plans to give confidence
tWat_t_he landing gear will deploy and lock as required.
Response:   Ground tests of Orbiter landing gear deployment
will be conducted under simulated flight conditions. In
addition to ground tests, it is planned to conduct a deploy-
ment test during landing high speed rollout of the mated 747/
Orbiter. The results of the ground and flight tests will be
utilized to verify proper Orbiter landing gear deploy and
lock prior to Orbiter free flight.
Page 6, Para. 1.22.8.3
Comment: An area that warrants review now is the plan to have
adequate GSE at the proper place to support the ALT program.
Response:  All of the GSE required for ALT has been identified
and design is approximately 96f complete. As of mid-August,
1976, there are no anticipated problems-associated with having
ALT GSE in place on time.
Page 6, Para. 1.22.8.6
Comment: The flight software requirements warrant review so
the— r- ems an identical flight profile for autoland and manual
modes.
Response: ALT software requirements for autoland and the
man-- uual control modes have been established so that the pilot
and commander will be able to fly the same trajectory as auto-
land (within the limits of human error). Flight plans are
being grepared for compatible trajectories for both the outer
120/13 and inner 1.5 0 glide slopes.
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0 Page 7. Para. 1.11.3.7
SmMpt s Anarea that warrants review now is the provision
to allow the crew to adjust the gain of the control system.
The proposal for pilot control of Flight Control
ystem (FCS) gain was disapproved following detailed manage-
sent review at the ALT Critical Design Review. The rationale
for this decision is discussed in detail in our response to
the ASAP suggestion that this proposal be further reviewed
(see our response to paragraph 8.0, M. C. of the ASAP
Report).
•	 Page 7 0 Para. 1.11I.A.
Comment: Give attention to the effectiveness of recent changes
In e avionics management approach and the need for a software
expert in the Technical Assessment Office as an independent
advisor and check and balance.
R -2 o_nse: The need to augment the Technical Assessment Office
w-it software expertise has been known by management. As soon
as qualified personnel can be found they will be added to the
staff.
•	 Page 7, Para. 1.III.B.
Comment: The management system to assure that contingency
ort analyses are gives: the proper priority now so that
changes, particularly, in the software, are being made while
there is still the capability for,phanges.
Response:  The Ascent and Entry Working Group established by
e YMqht Operations Panel (FOP) provides a focal point for
abort analyses. The review and implementation of contingency
abort analysis findings are now an active function of the FOP
and Operations Integration Review process.
•	 Page 7, Para. 1.III.C.
Comment: Give attention to the total or integrated management
plan o assure SRS reliability.
Response: An SRB R,,Q&A plan (6E-020-005-2H) has been baselined
at leveT III which constitutes an overall plan of the require-	
.^
ments and controls to ensure high M reliabilityy. The overall
management system, although the prima responsibility of the
Project Office has been designed to ensure that all critical 	 ,,
failure ages/hazards and their effects are identified, reviewed
and their impact assessed continuously at all program levels.
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Above and beyond the normal major milestone reviews, addi-
tional activities and controls have been Implemented as
follows: A special intercepter 5,R60A Panel with appropriate
subpanels has been created, joint surveys at all levels are
being conducted, CIL's are being baselined to ensure manage-
sent attention and approval of disposition actions/controls
and an overall system level failure reporting and tracking
system implemented.
I Page t, Para. I.W.A.
Comment: The selection of a material and its methods of
app cation for the external insulation, so that the program
gets the flight performance it needs.
Re
sponse: Dated on recently completed cryogenic tests, as
eas flammability resistance and wind tunnel tests at
AFDC the program has baselined CPR-488 compound as the now
SOFT for the external tank. Methods of application of this
material is the same as that used for the previously used
compound (CPR 421) .
•	 Page 8, Para. I.N.B.
Cow: Safeguards to protect auxiliary power unit with
sea water exposure.
Response: The design requirements for the APU requires the
component to have the capability of 20 uses after sea water
exposure. As indicated in the ASAP report, we have been
very succes4ful in our sea water tests in.flushing out the
catalytic bed and refiring the gas generator successfully.
We are still in the process of conbucting sea water ixmersion
tests of the APU and will use the results of these tests to
make any required changes to assure compliance with design
requirements. Some of the results of the test indicate
differences in torque requirements and sealant requirements
to prevent water from entering the gear box.
Page O f
 Para. 1. N. C. l .	 0-i
Comment: Follow closely the provisions to assure that TPS
sta ation procedures and tools will maintain the required
gap and step between tiles and to avoid the problem of an
early tripping of the boundary layer.
Response : We agree that this is an area requiriag diligent
• tention and plane and progress are continuously reviewed.
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Rockwell and Lockheed, in a parallel effort, are evaluating
two simplified approaches for installing TPS the arrays.
These investigations are expected to be completed in
September, 1976, and the solution is expected to assure
acceptable step and gap control.
Validity of the stringent criteria currently used is subject
to reassessment but the final proof will be determined
during the early flights, where the trajectories will be
tailored to provide adequata margins.
Page 9, Para. 1.W.C.2.
Comment: follow closely the provision to adequately protect
vehicle openings during entry with insulation while assuring
this insulation will not obstruct the operation of doors.
Response: A minimum of the doors are required to operate
prior to reentry. The payload bay doors, vents, umbilical
doors and aero sensors are exceptions. Of those, the pay-
1 cqd bay doors and vents are located in relatively protected
areas and the seal on the payload bay door, which was found
to lose its flexibility when cold, is being changed to a
design not affected by orbital temperatures. The umbilical
doors actuate after 8T separation and provisions have been
made to cycle the doors and latches independently for
trouble shooting on orbit. The seals selected should not
be vulnerable to effects of temperature encountered. The
landing gear doors and others are closed and sealed prior
to launch and no physical change is anticipated in the material
which would compromise operation.
Page 15, Para. 2.II.A.3.
Comment: The staff of engineers in the systems engineering
office may need to be increased. Management regularly should
review the staffing of the systems engineering office to
assure that its capability is appropriate for its responsibi-
lities.
Response: Agree. Some upward adjustments have been made in
the staffing of the systems engineering office. More people
could be used productively in engineering and integration.
Page 15 0 Para. 2.1I.A.4
Comment: Most of the directives have to do with responsibili-
t"'^eseor monitoring and evaluating Space Shuttle progress
rather than specifying how the daily work gets done Or bow the
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sdaily integration decisions are made. some do not clearly
define responsibilities.
e nee: The Systems Engineering Office is an organizational
element under the Systems Integration Manager and a conven-
tional management relationship exists. Instructions to the
technical organizations outside the program office, however,
may take different forms depending upon the nature of the
direction and the associated impact, but are typically from
within the chain of the Level II PRCB, the Systems Integra-
tion Review (SIR), or the Technical Manager/Technical Panel
area. Responsibilities of each are covered by program
directives and need to be considered collectively in defining
relationships. For the example cited, daily integration
effort is performed by the responsible NASA/contractor organi-
zation, as coordinated within the framework of the technical
manager/panel structure and under the guidance of the Systems
Engineering Office. Issues that need a broader review by
nature of the interfaces or technical considerations are
brought to the SIR, which is chaired by the Systems Integra-
tion Manager, for resolution. Those issues that involve
requirement changes, cost or schedule impact, or substantial
differences in technical options, are submitted to the Program
Manager's Level II PRCB for decision and direction.
Page 16, Para. 1.II.A.S.
Comment: Work on this (system engineering) plan has been
delayed  further. If the plan is not to be available in a
timely fashion, the manavament will have to assure that the
basic need that required such a document is met in another
way.
Response: The system engineering plan consists of engineering
master schedules and narrative sections detailing the working
process of the responsible technical organizations. The
heart of the plan is the schedule of input-output milestone
commitments for the systems engineering/integration effort
across the program. A conscious decision was made to concen-
trate on completing the milestone schedules as early as
possible and allow the narratives to be developed as resources
permit. The schedules have been released and in use since
December, 1975. Since that time, improvements in detail
definition have been made and updates are periodically incorpor-
ated in the master schedules. A System Integration Manager's
Review and a Program Manager's Integration Review was institu-
ted'to provide for timely discussion of integration and
resource issues that cow out of the scheduling activity. Nost
of the narrative sections of the plan have now been completed
and the remainder are in review. This delay has not affected
the overall purpose for which the plans wore intended. Ir
Page 17, Para. 2.II.A.7.
Maim*nt •• Newly established chief engineer at MSFC for then Propulsion System was not a member of the Systems inte-
gration Review Panel ( SIR) at JSC. The panel believes that
he•should have direct participation and membership in the
Systems Integration Rewiew Panel activities, as well as be
a part of the approval cycle for Level II and III documents.
Res on l: MSFC wrote a letter to JSC (12 November 1975)
requesting that Mr. Charles Wood (Chief Eng. at MSFC for
the Main Propulsion System) be added as a member of the SIR.
JSC answered that the organization concept of the SIR was
developed within the context of having a key Level II parti-
cipant representing each functional area. Mr. Richard
Ferguson, of JSC, was designated "Technical Manager for
Integrated Propulsion and Fluids" for the area of interest
to Mr. Wood. As such, Mr. Ferguson is available to coordi-
nate with Mr. Wood relative to appropriate MSFC inputs to
the SIR. In addition, Mr. Wood ' s name has been included for
SIR meetings, announcements, minutes, etc. As such, Mr. Wood
has direct input to Mr. Ferguson and the SIR panel for acti-
vities pertaining to the Main Propulsion System. Mr. Wood has
the same relationship to the SIR panel as Mr. J. R. Thompson,
MSFC SSME Project Manager, that is, direct participation
in SIR panel activities in his area of interest.
•	 Page 18, Para. 2.II.B . 1. and 2.
Comment: 1. The Panel favors the role of identifying pro-
l^ so the assessment groups can cover more areas of the
program. 2. The Panel augge5ts that priority be given to
safety issues rather than non-safety issues that may seem
more pressing.
Response: The assessment groups operate under broad charters
and in general, identify, review, and evaluate rather than
work a resolution to a problem. Problem solving is the
responsibility of the inline organizations. The establish-
ment of priorities is an internal process and reflects the
considered judgment of the individual group and particular
Center emphasis. Safety issues demand high priority but we
would not want to exclude non-safety issues. Periodic repor-
ting to the Program Director and Management Council provides
a mechanism for reordering priorities if it is judged desir-
able.
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•	 Page 20, Para. 2.11.C.1.
Comment: The explosion of a solid rocket booster, a main
eeqine# the external tank, or a reaction control system in
all likelihood cause the lose of an orbiter. Thus, all
possible measures must be taken to prevent such an occurrence
or to provide warning so that such an explosion could be
prevented.
SSHE Res onse: The Hawkins team was chartered to conduct an
overall assessment of the Space Shuttle system. Out of this
review came a separate "Engine Margin Review" whose objective
was to "Reassess the SSME Structural Design". This assessment
and structural audit was completed and reported on to the
Hawkins Committee as well as to top NASA officials. Any
additional reviews should start with reviewing the results of
the Hawkins Team and the SSME Margin Review.
In addition, the Critical Design Review (CDR) will be hold in
September, 1976, which will assess the maturity of the SSME
through a review of the design and testing results.
SRB Response: Plans are being implemented which identifies
e approaches used, control methods, and procedures to en-
sure proper quality controls. These plans include identifi-
cation of all failure modes, effects of these modes, hazard
analysis, sneak circuit analyses and other risk assessments
that could have a potential failure mode. The results of all
these analyses are tracked with a continual assessment of
program risks.
In addition to conducting assessment of potential risks to
the SRB, specific requirements are imposed on the design to
minimize failure modes. For example, these include using
proven propellants used in previous solid motor programs,
adding extra insulation to prevent the possibility of case
burntthrough, and a well defined development and qualifica-
tion test program which includes 7 motor firings.
OHS Ra
_s onse: The ONS subsystem manager and design personnel
met
	
the ASAP people at the beginning of the OMS POD
development effort and adopted the following design/operational
features for the OHS design to accommodate all 'known' safety
requirements: (a) A fire wall is designed into the pod to
separate the propellant tanks from the engine proper - it is
not a blast wall, however, (b) a second isolation valve was
installed in the OX tanks pressurant line between the regula-
tor and the OX tank down stream of the 'Tee" junction, which
also supplies =2 to the fuel tank.
} r1 M ti	
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(c) The OX and fuel fill and drain valves are located on
opposite sides of the vehicle (i.e., fill fuel from Rt. POD
only and fill OX from Lt. POD only)t (d) Shuttle pilots will
have caution and warning lights on propulsion panel for
identification of low pressure conditions in any of the
fluid or pneumatic components of the OHS.
RCS Response: (a) The RCS plumbing and tankage is designed
to no-fall imits of structural stresses. (b) RCS - GSE
will have vapor detection sniffer capability for personnel
safety (pre and post launch). (c) RCS plumbing will be
leak checked pre and post launch. (d) Filling and draining
criteria same as OMS.
4	 Page 20, Para. 2.II.C.2.
Cow: SRB or External Tank separation.
Res onse: The signals which arm and fire the "pyrotechnic"
ev as for the solids are dual redundant and the pyros are
dual redundant. There are no known software contingency
techniques to deal with the very remote problem of the fail-
ure of the solids to separate.
•	 Page 20 1 Para. 2.II.C.3
Comment: In the early flights there will be no Shuttle to
perform rescue services, so effort should be made to minimize
contingencies which might cause rescue to be nee ded. These
include doors (payload bay doors, or umbilical door) which
cannot be closed prior to reentry or the failure of the
external tank to separate.
Response:^ The Space Shuttle is not designed to be dependent
upon a rescue vehicle as a contingency backup. Crew safety
requirements are the same as for previous programs where no
rescue capability existed. Payload bay doors, for example,
must be closed prior to reentry. The doors cannot be adequa-
tely verified as a system, prior to flight, because of the
one •q• environment. Reliability will depend on simple,
straight forward design which is amenable to analysis, and
4
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component testing. On any flight during which the doors will
be opened, ZVA capability will be provided, together with the
necessary tools, etc. to permit manual closure of the doors
by an ZVA crewman.
Page 21, Para. 2.I1.C.4.
Comment: Suggested that input and output devices and mecha-
nisms a reviewed to doubly assure no "hard-overs" can exist.
Response: The solids and the main engine gimbal systems are
controlled by four port force-sum actuators. The system is
being designed to tolerate two consecutive failures. In
the remote case of a main "engine out" problem the failed
engine will be gimballed in a fail-safe position such that
the remaining two can be gimballed througqh their full
authority of + 10.5 degrees pitch and + 8.5 degrees yaw.
Input-Output aevicas and mechanisms for controlling the
engine gimball e s are under constant analyses and reviews.
Page 21, Para. 2.ri.C.5
Comment: Adequacy of test and APU system design should be
E a "'wed .
Response: JSC indicated the APU is currently under safety
and operational review and will continue to be so until all
SSME gimbal and other hydraulic system functions are satis-
fied.
A turbine wheel scatter shield has been designed into the
turbine housing assembly to preclude a category 1 failure
from an exploding turbine wheel.
0	 Page 21, Para. 2.II.C.6
Comment: Loss of pressure in the cabin appears to be a
s ngu ar and important hazard. There are two cabin air
supply systems and three fuel cells which provide cabin air
pressure and conditioning. The system must operate for the
entire mission and total failure would be fatal. It is
suggested that a concentrated review take place seeking once
again the strong confirmation that there is a remote enough
risk to take. A third air supply system might be feasible
and valuable.
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Response: We agree that the loss of cabin pressure is a
cri— tt-'ar and important hazard. There are two general
categories of failures which could result in the loss of
cabin pressure. One is the loss of pressure by external
leaks: the other, by failure of the gas distribution and
control system itself. An ancillary high pressure oxygen
tank is provided for emergency backup. In the event of
excessive external leakage, it will provide an 8 psig
cabin pressure for a leak aperature equivalent to a .45
dia. hole for 165 minutes. An incident of such a leak is
considered to be remote.
The primary mode of oxygen supply is from the fuel cell
power reactant tanks. The nitrogen is stored in four high
pressure vessels. Many of the systems components are
identical to those of the Skylab which functioned perfect-
ly for 171 days. Other redundant functions and hardware
have been incorporated into the Orbiter, such as two stage
pressure regulation, crossover manifolds, isolation values
and manual controls. Failure mode and effects analyses
have identified the most critical hazards and certification/
qualification plans have been baselined. We believe the
addition of a third air supply would result in unnecessary
cost, weight and complexity. We feel the continuing atten-
tion to the development and qualification of our present
baseline will result in low risk to crew safety and mission
success.
e	 Page 22, Para. 2. II. C. 7
Cow: Reevaluate Total System
Response: The controls and the APV systems are three
parallel systems. Two APU systems are required to share
the load.
e	 Page ^2, Para. 2. II. C. 8
Comment: "Destruct" decisions for operational flight are
needed.
Rest: Decisions regarding employment of a flight ter-
mination system during the STS operational time period will
not be made for sometime. In the next two years, the joint
NASA USAF Range Safety Ad Hoc Committee will be exploring
the risk-benefit considerations of planned operations. The
involuntary risk must be maintained at a level acceptable to
the public and at the same time bear a reasonable relationship
to the voluntary risk accepted by flight personnel. We do not
expect that decisions in this area will be confirmed until the
OFT series is completed.
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• Page 23, Para. 2. II. C.
amnent: A similar detail review should be :wade of the
crossover capability which exists on the control system to
maintain hydraulic pressure in the event of APU failure with
specific focus on the adequacy of maintaining hydraulic pres-
sure in the main engine control valve system. If an APU
shuts down there will be an automatic shutdown of that engine
being served.
• on : In the event of an APU failure, crossover capa-
bility exists to maintain hydraulic pressure in the SSME TVC,
•19von actuators and wheel brakes. While crossover
capability does not exist for SSME propellant control (due to
cost, schedule and weight considerations), mission safety is
not compromised. An APU failure would result in the shutdown
of one SSME which would result in a safe intact abort case.
•	 Page 24, Para. 2. III. A.
Comment: "Comprehensive review of integrating groups
operations should be conducted regularly to insu r e respon-
siveness to program needs."
Rescue:  Agree. The integration activity in support of
program requirements is highlighted through reviews with the
Program Director, Associate Administrator for Space Flight,
and selected Management Council topics. Special technical
reviews are held in areas where support is critical, and,
resource adjustments are made if required. The system inte-
gration organization and working relationships are well
established but changes are made in panel structure and
assignments as improvements are needed.
•	 Page 24, Para. 2. Iii. C. and D.
Comment: C. Individuals at the systems integration level
at JSC and at Rockwell's Space Division should be given
appropriate management responsibility, authority and re-
sources for contingency analysis and planning.
D. Analysis and evaluation of vehicle capability for off-
design cases should be done now, rather than later when
necessary changes would be prohibitively costly. Staffing
needed for this effort should be provided.
R= ^n_se_: Most of the vehicle analysis for off-design/
contingency capability has been delayed in deference to
design/analysis effort in support of the Critical Design
Review (CDR). This is an acceptable approach since no
major hardware chimges are anticipated to provide for con-
tingency capability. Minor changes could be incorporated
after the
 CDR.
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